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 Abstract 
Resolving an intrastate war can be a difficult task. Angola and Mozambique, both 
former Portuguese colonies which both gained independency in 1975, has 
suffered longstanding intrastate war. Within a year and a half they both signed 
their first peace agreements, with different outcomes to follow. This thesis has 
two purposes. The main one is to use Kumar Rupesinghe’s model of conflict 
transformation in order to analyse why Angola’s peace failed and why 
Mozambique’s lasted. A comparative case study of the two countries is performed 
with the help of mainly secondary sources like books and articles written by 
academic scholars. The analysis shows that Mozambique employed initiatives, in 
accordance with Rupesinghe’s model, in a much wider scope than Angola, and 
hence it can count as being one of the reasons why Mozambique’s peace lasted 
whilst Angola’s failed.  
The other purpose is to test Rupesinghe’s model’s usefulness. Findings show 
that the model is interesting and useful and can be used as one way to explain why 
a peace last or fail, but also that it has its shortcomings. For example, there are 
elements within the model which are too similar and also the aspect of culture has 
not been taken into account in Rupesinghe’s model. 
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 1 Introduction 
Countries suffering from war will at some point face a peace process leading to a 
peace agreement. Violent interstate and intrastate wars have characterised and still 
characterise several African countries. Two African countries which have been 
plauged by longlasting war are Angola and Mozambique, where the war in 
Angola is one of the most destructive ones ever. They are both former Portuguese 
colonies which gained independence in 1975. After their respective 
independencies intrastate wars broke out between opposing groups with the 
support of superpowers. In Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the USA, Zaire and 
South Africa supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA). During the years of war the supporting countries did little in order to 
stop the bloodshed in Angola. In Mozambique South Africa supported the 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), and China and the Soviet Union 
supported Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).  
After decades of war negotiations started between the warring parties, and in 
1991 Angola signed their first peace agreement. Mozambique signed theirs in 
1992. Angola soon again plunged back into war, whilst Mozambique has 
managed to sustain their peace. Although Angola and Mozambique share 
important similarities “their transition to peace and elected government produced 
different outcomes” (Malaquias 1998). Why did Angola’s peace fail whilst 
Mozambique’s lasted? Present research “provides surprisingly little guidance on 
why cease-fires fail or on what helps make peace last” (Fortna 2004:1). Surely 
there are many reasons as to why a peace fails or lasts, but are there things that 
can be done during the peace process in order to make the peace more likely to 
last? In this thesis it will, with the help of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict 
transformation, be analysed why the peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in 
Mozambique lasted. 
This thesis commences with an introduction chapter where the purpose of the 
thesis and the research question will be presented and there will also be a method 
and material discussion. Chapter two will pose a discussion around the three 
theoretical schools conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation. I will also motivate why Rupesinghe’s model of conflict 
transformation was chosen for this thesis. Chapter three and four will present the 
eleven elements of Rupesinghe’s model and it will become clear what Angola and 
Mozambique did or did not do during their peace processes with regard to each 
element. Finally, in chapter five the conclusions from the analyses will be 
presented and the usefulness of Rupesinghe’s model will be discussed.  
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 1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
Is there something that can be done to improve the chances of a durable peace? 
The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse why Angola’s peace failed whilst 
Mozambique’s lasted. Why did the two peace processes result in different 
outcomes? Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation takes up eleven 
elements which can be helpful in order to prepare for a stable peace in a country. 
Therefore, this thesis will focus on Rupesinghe’s elements and what initiatives 
were employed in the two countries during their peace processes. Hence, the 
research question reads as follows: 
 
• How can it, with the help of Rupesinghe’s model, be explained why the 
peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in Mozambique lasted? 
 
The additional purpose is to test Rupesinghe’s model’s usefulness, since it does 
not seem like it has been used very often. Therefore, it is interesting to test if the 
model is useful in a theoretical context and as far I know there has not been a 
study carried out using Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation on Angola 
and Mozambique. The aim with using Rupesinghe’s model is to test if it can 
explain the different outcomes of Angola’s and Mozambique’s peace processes, 
and if not, what is lacking in the model? In the final chapter I aspire to give some 
critical thoughts around Rupesinghe’s model.  
A wishful purpose is also that this study can be used as a contribution towards 
our understanding of initiatives which can play an importance in a country’s way 
toward peace.  
1.2 Methodology 
To be able to answer the research question a qualitative research method has been 
chosen, since a qualitative method is a way to capture the entirety (Esaiasson et. 
al. 2004:233, Devine 2002:207). Qualitative methods sometimes get criticized for 
being a limited research method because of the researcher not being able to draw 
generalizations. All research methods have their disadvantages and “what is a 
valid method depends on the aims and objectives of a research project (Devine 
2002:205). My main ambition is not to draw generalizations, but to analyse why 
Angola’s peace failed and Mozambique’s lasted. I do not aspire to tell people 
involved in peace processes how they should solve a war, I only seek to give 
recommendations on what elements should be considered to be included in a 
country’s peace process.  
This thesis is a case study of Angola’s and Mozambique’s initiatives 
employed during their respective peace processes. The two cases have been 
chosen on the basis of “most similar case design”, since there are several reasons 
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 which make these two countries fruitful to compare (Esaiasson et. al. 2004:111). 
Even though there are differences there are also numerous similarities, for 
example they are both former Portuguese colonies which got “freed from colonial 
rule in 1975 by Marxist liberation movements; and both spent their first two 
decades of independence mired in bitter internecine conflict” (Greenhill & Major 
2007:23). Furthermore, both wars were of intrastate character and went on for 
more than 16 years. Moreover, in both countries the conflict revolved around 
strong leaders; Jonas Savimbi for UNITA in Angola and Afonso Dhlakama for 
RENAMO in Mozambique. Angola is looked upon as a failure since the first 
peace agreement, the Bicesse Accord, broke down and the country plunged back 
into war once again. Mozambique on the other hand is looked upon as a success 
because their first peace agreement, the General Peace Agreement (GPA), has 
lasted. An important difference between these two countries is that Angola, as a 
contrast to Mozambique, is a country with a lot of natural resources, especially oil 
and diamonds. 
In order to carry out the research Rupesinghe’s model of conflict 
transformation has been used. Rupesinghe’s model can help to explain why 
Angola’s peace failed whilst Mozambique’s lasted. To be able to explain this I 
will need to identify what the two countries did with regards to the eleven 
elements presented in Rupesinghe’s model. The model has been chosen because it 
takes up several elements which Rupesinghe claims are necessary in order to 
achieve a durable peace.  Furthermore, it is not a model which seems to have been 
used a lot and it is pleasant to find a theory which is not developed by western 
theorists, since most of them are. Another reason why Rupesinghe’s model has 
been chosen is because it focuses on intrastate wars, which is applicable for both 
Angola and Mozambique.  
1.2.1 Sources – a Critical Discussion  
It could have been useful to visit Angola and Mozambique in order to be able to 
interview people with knowledge about the peace process. I reason that the 
material found whilst situated in Sweden is good enough in order to carry out the 
study in mind.  
Getting the history right can be seen as a difficult task since it can be complex 
to find the definite answers. “Only a handful of journalists followed the wars 
closely enough and long enough to have a historical perspective, and of those few, 
none was intimately acquainted with both sides of the wars. A high proportion of 
what was published, moreover, was written by journalists or scholars who knew 
neither Portuguese nor any local African language in Mozambique or Angola” 
(Minter 1994:77). In the aftermath of that, scholars have carried out research 
where they have examined smaller parts of previous material and also found new 
insights through interviews with for example participants in the wars. Therefore, I 
have used multiple sources in order to strengthen the validity of the material 
found (Esaiasson et. al. 2004:312). The sources used for this thesis are reliable 
secondary sources, such as books, reports and articles. By reliable sources I mean 
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 professional scholars like for example Alex Vines and Thomas Ohlson, and also 
well-reputed organisations such as the United Nations (UN). Sources like these 
are sadly not assured to be completely reliable, but by using them it is a way to 
avoid as many pitfalls as possible.  
1.2.2 Definitions 
Central concepts in this study are intrastate war and peace. I consider Angola and 
Mozambique “to be in peace” from the second they signed their respective peace 
agreements. 
When defining intrastate war I use Thomas Ohlson’s definition meaning “an 
incompatibility between the government of a state and at least one identifiable, 
organized actor within that state” (Ohlson 1998:32). In Angola it was a war 
between UNITA and MPLA; MPLA was at that time classed as being the 
government. In Mozambique the internal war was between RENAMO and 
FRELIMO, where FRELIMO was the government at that time.  
1.2.3 Delimitations 
The reasons why Angola’s peace failed and Mozambique’s lasted are several and 
all can not be covered in a thesis of this size. Therefore, the focus will be on the 
eleven elements in Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation and how they 
can explain the different outcomes of Angola’s and Mozambique’s peaces. Hence, 
the study can be more thorough than it would have been if other factors for the 
outcome of the peaces would have been involved.   
This thesis will focus on the time leading up to the countries first peace 
agreements; the Bicesse Accord for Angola and the GPA for Mozambique. This is 
because they were the first peace agreements after independence for both 
countries.  
It has been easier to find material concerning Angola and Mozambique on 
some of the elements in Rupesinghe’s model. Therefore, some of the elements, 
like ownership of the peace process and evaluating success and failure, have less 
facts about what actually happened in Angola and Mozambique during the peace 
process compared to for example elements like the role of outside and local 
peacemakers, where there was plenty of facts to be found about both countries. 
Still, I reason that the material found about both countries on each element is 
enough to be able to carry out a fruitful analysis.  
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 2 Theoretical Discussion 
In this chapter an overview of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation will 
be given. Two other theoretical schools will be presented shortly, namely conflict 
resolution and conflict management. Hence, this chapter will pose a short 
discussion around the three different theoretical schools, in order to show why 
conflict transformation has been chosen. Furthermore, Rupesinghe’s model of 
conflict transformation will be presented.  
2.1 Why Conflict Transformation? 
A comparative analysis of the initiatives employed in Angola and Mozambique 
would be of little interest if the initiatives were not to be put in a theoretical 
context. With the help of the analyses, conclusions about the importance of the 
different elements of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation can be 
drawn. All three theoretical schools presented below have differences, but “all 
three schools rely on a shared tradition of thinking about conflict and 
intervention” (Miall 2004:17). 
2.1.1 Conflict Management 
Conflict management focuses, as they name reveals, on how to manage a conflict. 
It does not give ideas on how to solve a conflict. Conflict management theorists 
reason that violent conflicts arise as a result of differences in values and interests 
within and between communities. Furthermore, they see conflicts like these as 
impossible to solve, but it is possible “to reach a historic compromise in which 
violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed” (ibid 2004:3). Conflict 
management is also about how to intervene in a conflict and how to design 
appropriate institutions. One way to calm a conflict could be to send peacekeeping 
troops, but the troops would not be there to stop the conflict; instead they get sent 
to cut down on killings.   
2.1.2 Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution theorists, on the other hand, argue that people cannot 
compromise on their fundamental needs in communal and identity conflicts. 
Conflict resolution “therefore emphasises intervention by skilled but powerless 
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 third-parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new 
relationships” (Miall 2004:3). Conflict resolutionists try to develop a “processes 
of conflict resolution that appear to be acceptable to parties in dispute and 
effective in resolving conflict” (ibid 2004:4). The theory has an analytical and 
problem-solving approach. Furthermore, the theory focuses on finding reasons to 
the conflict and thereafter how to deal with them.  
2.1.3 Conflict Transformation 
“Conflict transformation theorists argue that contemporary conflicts require more 
than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes” (ibid 
2004:4). The theory points out the importance of involving the whole society in 
the process of peace building and it emphasises that outside mediation is not 
preferable. “It also recognizes that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a 
series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a 
variety of actors may play important roles” (ibid 2004:4). Furthermore, unlike 
conflict resolution which favours skilled third-parties, conflict transformation 
emphasises the importance of using people and their knowledge within the setting. 
According to conflict transformation theorists, peace-building necessitates far 
more than just elite agreements. 
Kumar Rupesinghe is a theorist within the field of conflict transformation who 
“argues for a comprehensive, eclectic approach to conflict transformation that 
embraces multitrack interventions. He proposes building peace constituencies at 
the grassroots level and across the parties at the civil society level (where it 
exists), and also creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about 
change, such as business groups, the media and the military. He sees conflict 
transformation as a broad approach incorporating conflict resolution training and 
Track I interventions including diplomatic interventions and peacekeeping” (ibid 
2004:5). Differences between conflict transformation and conflict resolution and 
management are that conflict transformation focuses on involving as broad 
spectrum of the society as possible in the peace process. Whereas conflict 
management circles around how to stabilize a war so that killings get cut, conflict 
transformation involves that aspect but also go all the way to a solution of a 
conflict.     
2.2 Rupesinghe’s Conflict Transformation Model  
Kumar Rupesinghe grew up in Sri Lanka but has studied and worked all over the 
world. He has written over 40 books and more than 200 articles about for example 
building peace in dived societies. Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation 
contains the following elements which he reason should be taken into account 
during a country’s peace process: 
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 (i) Pre-negotiation stage 
(ii) Understanding root causes 
(iii) Ownership of the peace process 
(iv) Identifying all the actors 
(v) Identifying facilitators 
(vi) Setting a realistic timetable 
(vii) Sustaining the effort 
(viii) Evaluating success and failure 
(ix) Strategic constituencies 
(x) The role of outside peacemakers 
(xi) The role of local peacemakers 
 
The following two chapters will give a comparative analysis of the initiatives 
employed in Angola and Mozambique during their peace processes using 
Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation. In order to carry out an as 
thorough analysis as possible each element of the model will be considered and 
they will be presented in the same order as shown above, and what was done in 
Angola and Mozambique, with regard to the specific element, will be presented 
and analysed.  
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 3 From Pre-negotiation to Sustaining 
the Effort 
3.1 Pre-negotiation Stage 
The purpose of this stage is to bring the warring parties into the negotiation 
process and realistic goals for the negotiation process should be set up. It is 
important that the parties have a will to commit to peace. “The ‘strategic intent’ of 
the pre-negotiation phase is to reduce intractability, to formulate and design a 
process which can bring parties to the negotiation table and to begin the trust- and 
confidence-building necessary for a successful negotiating exercise” (Rupesinghe 
1995:80). It should be questioned why the warring parties are coming to the 
negotiation table and it is important to understand their motivations for deciding 
to come to the negotiation table. Are they ready to negotiate for peace or are they 
just trying to buy time whilst they get resupplied?  
3.1.1 Angola 
The warring parties came to the negotiation table in Angola was out of two 
reasons. Firstly, access to weapons was lower than ever. MPLA had lost their 
main supplier for weapons, which was the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Cuba 
withdrew their troops which affected UNITA’s warfare. As a consequence of this, 
the USA also proved less enthusiastic to military aid UNITA. Still, MPLA and 
UNITA respectively were equipped with heavy weapons and controlled 
significant sectors of the country.  Taking up arms would be an option for both 
MPLA and UNITA if they did not feel satisfied with the negotiations. Once the 
peace agreement had been settled the “MPLA shifted approximately 20 000 of its 
elite troops into a paramilitary police force; whilst UNITA kept its heaviest 
weapons and more than 25 000 battled-hardened fighters hidden in the bush” 
(Gounden & Solomon 2001:185). 
Secondly, the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal, were intensely pressuring 
the parties to negotiate. The warring parties in Angola did not go into the 
negotiations because they were ready, but because the negotiations were imposed 
on them.  
Furthermore, it was not possible for the warring parties to start negotiating 
since the trust between them was non-existent. “It was a negotiation to be dictated 
 8
 by Washington, Moscow and Lisbon but had no relevance to the situation on the 
ground in Angola” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:185). Still, the talks came under 
way. “Both parties accepted a Portuguese mediation offer in early 1990, but the 
negotiations did not lead anywhere until the USA and the USSR joined Portugal 
as observers” (Ohlson 1998:74). The talks carried on and once at the negotiation 
table UNITA figured that since the peace agreement would lead up to an election 
they were certain they would win. Hence, UNITA reasoned that it was a reason 
good enough to stay in the negotiations. MPLA was also certain that UNITA 
would win the election. “In fact, for the US (with the consent of the two others), 
peace was not the first and only aim. The peace process was perceived more as a 
route for UNITA to come to power” (Messiant 2004). UNITA had put down their 
weapons to one degree, but they had only done that because they were certain that 
they would win the election. Had they known that MPLA would win the election, 
surely they would not have gone into the negotiations. The peace was doomed 
already from the start since the way the peace eventually came about had effect on 
the duration of the peace.  
3.1.2 Mozambique 
The warring parties in Mozambique reached a stalemate in the early 1990s when 
they both realized that neither side would win. It came across since none of the 
parties were getting any more supplies from their supporters, as a consequence of 
the end of the Cold War. (Ohlson 1994) The Soviet Union stopped giving 
financial support to FRELIMO. South Africa stopped supplying RENAMO 
because the country itself was due to go through a democratic transition. Another 
reason for the beginning of the negotiations was the devastating drought plaguing 
Mozambique. “The famine which followed brought both FRELIMO and 
RENAMO to the point of exhaustion, so that neither side was able to continue the 
armed struggle” (Newitt 2002:221). The most difficult problem facing 
Mozambique was “how to bring Dhlakama and Renamo into the peace process” 
(Ohlson 1998:136). Still with the help of for example the Mozambican Christian 
Council (CCM), Tiny Rowland (a multi-millionaire businessman), and several 
countries (which we will see about later in the analyses), negotiations came 
underway. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO felt good about the negotiations 
commencing since they both figured they could not pursue the war any longer.  
3.2 Understanding Root Causes 
Rupesinghe proclaims that “it is abundantly clear from the experiences in 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere that there is a need for a 
clear conceptual and theoretical understanding of the root causes and the sources 
of intractability of a given conflict” (Rupesinghe 1996:166). Settlements which 
ignore the root causes can face further confrontation. How and why a war started 
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 needs to be addressed in order to know when to intervene and also to be able to 
facilitate the proper resolution to a war.  
3.2.1 Angola 
In the case of Angola “it is difficult not to escape the stark fact that the root causes 
of the conflict had less to do with ideological (capitalism vs communism) and 
ethnic (Ovimbundu vs Mbundus) considerations and more to do with the desire 
for complete control on the part of leaders who utilised such considerations as 
vehicles for their own naked political ambitions” (Gounden & Solomon 
2001:186). The leaders of UNITA and MPLA, and perhaps also the mediators, 
must have been fairly aware of what the underlying issues were, but still these 
were not brought up. If they would have been than the Bicesse Accord could have 
been altered in alliance with these and a breakout of the war once again could 
have been avoided. There was a deep mistrust between MPLA and UNITA and 
this fact was not given consideration during the negotiations or in the Bicesse 
Accord. The civil war in Angola involved not only high political stakes but even 
greater economic interests given its immense natural resources, particularly oil 
and diamonds. “Lack of a consensus on how Angola's wealth should be divided in 
a post-conflict era ultimately booby-trapped the entire peace operation” 
(Malaquias 1998). During the negotiations a resolution to the main underlying 
internal problems never got discussed. 
3.2.2 Mozambique 
Mozambique on the other hand did not experience the same problem as Angola 
concerning natural resources, since they hardly have any natural resources. 
Already early in the peace process the warring parties agreed that they would try 
to end the war together. “The Mozambican case underlines the crucial need for 
peacemaking initiatives to come to terms with the underlying, often hidden, 
factors driving armed conflicts” (Armon et. al. 1998). There were several issues to 
the war in Mozambique and most of them got solved. “The settlement eventually 
met all of Renamo’s demands for a multiparty state, the end of the Marxist-
Leninist political and economic system, and the inclusion of more traditional 
political and religious authorities” (Lloyd 2001:318). One example of an issue 
which did not get solved was land distribution. Furthermore, Lloyd writes that 
regional and ethnic rivalry, political freedom and rights did not get fully solved.  
“If one sees the preemptive moves by Frelimo to address popular grievances 
as the prologue to the political settlement, then almost all the immediate 
grievances were resolved. The political settlement itself resolved the major 
outstanding grievance of access to the political system. Thus, the settlement’s 
resolution of the immediate causes of the conflict was sufficient to establish 
normal politics” (ibid 2001:319). Even though not all root causes got solved the 
resolution of the war had the support of the people in Mozambique. 
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 “Mozambicans were satisfied with the resolution of the grievances and its 
outcome: peace” (Lloyd 2001:320). The support of the people is a requisite for 
peace to last.  
3.3 Ownership of the Peace Process 
Rupesinghe states that it is vital to involve “local actors so that they become the 
primary architects, owners and long-term stakeholders in the peace process” 
(Rupesinghe 1995:81). If the international community has too much of a say and 
stress the warring parties it might do more harm than good. “International 
pressure is not applicable in many intra-states conflicts plaguing the world today” 
(Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000). If local actors are involved they will support the 
peace work because they will feel it is “their” peace.  
3.3.1 Angola 
In the case of Angola “the Bicesse Accord was, in large measure, imposed upon 
the parties” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:187). Foreign leaders were the actual 
architects of the peace agreement, not local actors and Angola’s leaders, which 
would have been the main objective. Hence, it does not appear surprising that 
fighting continued throughout the peace process. Since Angolans were not 
particularly involved in the peace process; they did not feel they had to obey its 
conditions. The Bicesse Accord was “orchestrated by Portugal with help from the 
superpowers” (Birmingham 2002:170). The USA and the Soviet Union were at 
that time counted as being the superpowers, with the USA pulling most of the 
weight. Furthermore, the peace process did not include all different ethnic groups 
in Angola, and with Angola’s troublesome history concerning ethnicity in the 
country it should have been a requisite that they all should be offered to get 
involved in the peace process.  
3.3.2 Mozambique 
Before the negotiations started Chissano, president of FRELIMO, prepared “the 
Mozambican people for the prospect of negotiations” (Ohlson 1998:138). “In 
contrast to Angola, where superpower rivalry both escalated the level of conflict 
and aided at key points in promoting conflict resolution, the dynamics of conflict 
and conflict resolution in Mozambique were dominated by regional rather than 
global geopolitics” (Minter 1994:165). As will be shown under chapter 3.4.2 a 
broad selection of local actors, like CCM, women groups, were involved in the 
peace process in one way or another, and therefore it can be counted as if 
Mozambicans owned their peace process.  
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 3.4 Identifying All the Actors 
It is important for the peace process that all actors like for example elites, leaders, 
women, non-military actors and opinion-shapers get identified and brought into 
the peace process. “Accurate identification must be made of all significant actors 
– the visible and articulate elites as well as the less visible, less articulate, but still 
influential opinion shapers and leaders” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). Failure in 
bringing all the different actors into the peace process can result in a breakdown 
of the process. It is out of importance that non-military actors are “fully involved 
in the peace process because exclusive reliance on highly visible political or 
military elites has proved disastrous in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and even 
Sri Lanka” (ibid).  
3.4.1 Angola 
Little effort was spent on bringing the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda (FLEC) to the negotiating table. It came as no surprise “that they issued a 
statement on 31 July 1992 saying they would boycott the elections and carry on an 
armed struggle until independence for Cabinda was won” (Gounden & Solomon 
2001:188). To not involve FLEC in the negotiations was a mistake since Cabinda 
is the region which is very rich of oil and the rest of the country are dependent 
upon the profits there from. Since the USA, the Soviet Union and Portugal, and 
also UNITA and MPLA to some extent, dominated the peace process in Angola. 
Hence, for example potential elites or opinion-shapers were excluded from 
Angola’s peace process.  
3.4.2 Mozambique 
In Mozambique CCM worked hard in getting all the warring actors into the peace 
process. Furthermore, all major political actors, together with the superpowers, 
participated in consultative processes. In Mozambique the Organisation of 
Mozambican Women (OMM) got formed in order to spread their broad political 
agenda for Mozambique and also to raise awareness about women. The members 
grew steadily and one of the organisations missions was to lobby for peace. 
Furthermore, the members went around the country to tell other women what they 
could expect if Mozambique would reach peace. (Moran & Pitcher 2004) 
Mozambique got a lot of actors into the peace process, since for example women 
and CCM were involved.  
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 3.5 Identifying Facilitators 
Who could be a good person to design the peace process? People who can 
contribute with their expertise and knowledge about different issues are 
favourable. For example people “who have the background knowledge, analytic 
and mediation skills to make a positive contribution to the design process” 
(Rupesinghe 1995:81).  
3.5.1 Angola 
In the case of Angola the facilitators were people from the USA, the Soviet Union 
and Portugal, since these countries were the ones who imposed the peace 
negotiations on the Angolans. “There were no internal facilitators whom the 
parties could agree upon” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:188). For the “other 
international actors the involvement of the US was a sufficient guarantee that 
events would run smoothly” (Messiant 2004). Perhaps the USA, the Soviet Union 
and Portugal had high-quality mediation skills, but since they had not been living 
in the country nor had a lot of personal experience of Angola’s background they 
were not the optimal facilitators. People living locally in Angola would have been 
more suitable.  
3.5.2 Mozambique 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe was crucial for the peace process in Mozambique 
since he managed to bring Chissano to recognize Dhlakama and RENAMO and 
also reassured Dhlakama that it would be safe for him and RENAMO to enter the 
peace process. Mugabe can also be thanked for bringing the two parties together 
in Rome for the significant talks which lead to the peace agreement being signed. 
(Ohlson 1998) Furthermore, FRELIMO contacted the Vatican which in turn 
suggested the services of Sant’ Egidio, a Catholic community which was founded 
in Rome 1968, to help with the peace process (see also chapter 4.3.2). Sant' Egidio 
representatives “had the credentials to mediate due to their long-standing 
familiarity with Mozambican issues and because they were well known to one or 
both belligerents” (Armon et. al. 1998). The strength of Sant’ Egidio was that they 
were taking it slowly in order to keep a valuable dialogue with the parties.  
Tiny Rowland’s involvement was also of great importance, since he “became 
personally engaged in the peace process and was instrumental in building up 
Renamo’s confidence to step out of the bush and negotiate” (Vines 1998). He had 
experience of negotiating with rebels since 1982. Rowland also flew the different 
parties to places where negotiations were due to be held. When the peace 
negotiations started only the two warring parties, Rowland and President Mugabe 
were present. There were some issues RENAMO and FRELIMO could not agree 
upon and they became more and more impatient, starting to give up. Rowland 
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 then “intervened, pleading that having got so close to an agreement, it was surely 
worth waiting a short while longer to conclude it” (Vines 1998). Soon after the 
parties agreed and signed the agreement. After the peace agreement had been 
reached Chissano publicly thanked Rowland saying Rowland “facilitated contacts, 
gave advice, and helped find ways to ensure the meeting would be held” (ibid). 
Hence, Rowland’s involvement in the peace process was of uttermost importance. 
Rowland was the only person whose advice Dhlakama trusted and Dhlakama 
expressed his gratitude towards Rowland since he had worked so hard to make the 
peace possible. 
“The United States, Great Britain, France, Portugal and the United Nations 
had also provided political and technical support, ensuring that implementation of 
the GPA would have broad international backing. This was crucial because the 
agreement was in many ways flawed. Not only had many practical elements been 
insufficiently discussed, but both sides lacked the capacity to set up and operate 
the complex structures required for implementation” (Rupiya 1998). Hence, 
Mozambique had, compared to Angola, several facilitators involved in the peace 
process. 
3.6 Setting a Realistic Timetable 
It is significant to set a timetable which includes different stages. The timetable 
should not be too long or too short. If it is too short there is a risk that the 
trustworthiness of the peace gets damaged. If it is too long and the negotiations go 
on for a long time then there is a risk that the drive for peace gets lost. “Those 
involved in designing the peace process must also devote an adequate amount of 
their time to the process” (Rupesinghe 1996:167). If a timetable attempts to do too 
much over a short period of time it may result in most not being done or done 
exceedingly bad. “Rupesinghe emphasizes the importance of setting a realistic 
timetable, from the identification of root causes and significant actors, through 
such phases as cease-fires, to the elaboration of mechanisms of political and social 
accommodation, for the success of the peace process” (Gounden & Solomon 
2001:189).   
3.6.1 Angola 
During the negotiations leading up to the Bicesse Accord the superpowers were 
staking out the peace agreement. According to the negotiations which led up to 
the Bicesse Accord, the Angolan government and UNITA were supposed to 
establish a new army consisting of 50,000 soldiers from their total of an estimated 
250,000 soldiers. The soldiers were also supposed to be demobilized to be used in 
the new army before elections were to be held. “However, from the start, the 
process of assembling government and rebel troops was very slow, resulting in 
huge delays in the establishment of the new army” (Malaquias 1998). This was 
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 because Angola was suffering from an immense number of logistical problems in 
the assembly areas, like lack of food, shelter and transportation. Not surprisingly 
it got “pointed out that, two and a half months after the assembly of troops was 
supposed to have been completed, barely 60 percent of the troops declared by 
both sides had been encamped in assembly areas” (Malaquias 1998). Furthermore, 
the report declared that such problems undermined confidence and also 
jeopardized the implementation of a range of other features of the Bicesse Accord.  
“UNITA argued for a maximum of twelve months between ceasefire and 
elections” (Minter 1994:53). MPLA on the other hand opted for 36 months since 
it would take a fairly long time to set up several conditions for holding elections. 
The final agreement they agreed upon “set the election for fifteen to eighteen 
months” (Minter 1994:53). Since the three countries supporting UNITA were 
certain that UNITA would win the election (and that was also UNITA’s and the 
supporting countries aim) “is why an early date for the elections was set, despite 
being a totally unrealistic time frame for the completion of all the necessary tasks” 
(Messiant 2004). All the tasks agreed upon in the negotiations leading up to the 
Bicesse Accord was supposed to be achieved within this time span, which can be 
looked upon as being unattainable owing to the amount of different missions it 
included. Owing to Angola’s history of several disputes over different issues, the 
amount of soldiers within the country and the distrust between UNITA and MPLA 
there were several issues which would take time to solve. 15 months might sound 
like a long time but with regard to the things taken up in this section it can be 
understood why the short time span was one of the reasons the peace in Angola 
did not last. If the superpowers would have understood the conditions on the 
ground in Angola they would have been able to draw up a more realistic timetable 
which would have helped towards a lasting peace (Gounden & Solomon 
2001:192). Furthermore, there was a deep mistrust between the factions which 
takes time to heave. That fact did not get taken into account during the 
negotiations. Angola’s peace process leading up to the Bicesse Accord had what 
Rupesinghe would say – a timetable which tried to do too much over a short 
period.  
3.6.2 Mozambique 
In Mozambique the parties set up an agenda which stated that “the parties would 
discuss the main topics of the negotiations sequentially” (Cohen 1992). To finish 
one topic before proceeding on to the next one is a sought after procedure when 
negotiating since the different tasks get given substantial time to be fully solved. 
The parties involved in Mozambique’s peace process realized the process towards 
peace had to be slow in order to give RENAMO time to learn to become political 
instead of military. Just like in Angola there was distrust between the warring 
parties, but in Mozambique this got taken into account and FRELIMO postponed 
the election for a year from when it had been scheduled in the first place until the 
distrust had been solved. The peace talks in Mozambique “dragged on from July 
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 1990 to the final signing of a General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 
1992” (Newitt 2002:221).  
3.7 Sustaining the Effort 
In order for a peace process to be successful it is important to invest “financial 
resources, patience and a sustained commitment from sponsors” (Rupesinghe 
1995:82). 
3.7.1 Angola 
The UN only sent enough peacekeeping soldiers to cover for “one observer for 
every 333 soldiers which is a very low figure compared to, for example, Namibia 
where there was one observer for every six soldier (Gounden & Solomon 
2001:190). This shows that the sponsors did not invest considerable money or 
commitment to the peace process. Also for the warring parties to see that the 
sponsors did not seem to put a lot of interest in the war, might have made the 
parties feel indifferent towards whether there would be war or peace. When trying 
to find solutions for Angola, like in all wars, it was necessary to invest money, 
patience and commitment. This was not done to a great extent. “In Angola, the 
incapacity and unwillingness of the international community to commit enough 
resources weakened the prospects for success of peace-building attempts in the 
1990s” (Jeong 2005:192). If it would have been, the outcome of the peace process 
could have been a different one.   
3.7.2 Mozambique 
Just like in Angola there were sponsors involved in the peace process, but they 
were not dictating as much as the sponsors did in Angola. Instead they put more 
money, patience and commitment into Mozambique’s peace process than was the 
case of Angola. During the negotiations in Mozambique the parties could not 
agree upon several issues at the start, but they kept negotiating and put essential 
patience in the process. (Vines 1996) “The depth and intensity of external 
assistance during the Mozambican peace process and the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops following the accords” are seen as some of the main reasons 
for Mozambique’s successful transition from war to peace (Moran & Pitcher 
2004:503). For example, the UN “decided to pour resources of men, money and 
material into Mozambique to prevent the peace process coming unstuck – in 
marked contrast to the minimalist role it had assumed in Angola” (Newitt 
2002:222). The UN hade experienced the recent failure in Angola and learnt a 
lesson. Furthermore, Rowland also invested a lot of money, patience and 
commitment.  
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 4 From Evaluating Success and Failure 
to Local Peacemakers 
4.1 Evaluating Success and Failure 
Success and failure throughout the peace process needs to be addressed. This is of 
importance since people involved in peace process can learn from experiences of 
previous peace processes. It is important to evaluate whether “the main interests 
of the parties are being addressed, the precedents and principles used in searching 
for a solution and their usefulness, the obstacles encountered, factors that led to 
progress, alternatives and missed opportunities coordination with other 
peacemaking activities, and lessons to be learned from the process” (Rupesinghe 
1996:167).   
4.1.1 Angola 
Angola did not have a system within its peace process which evaluated success 
and failure. If they would have had such a system then maybe “the parties and 
international sponsors would have asked why throughout the negotiations leading 
up to the Bicesse Accords, fighting on the ground continued” (Gounden & 
Solomon 2001:191). Furthermore, if the parties involved in the peace process 
would have looked upon what was failing in the process they could have done 
something about it, and they could have learnt from any possible successes 
encountered during the process.  
4.1.2 Mozambique 
Since Angola’s peace process started earlier than in Mozambique the people 
involved in the peace process in Mozambique were following the development of 
Angola’s peace process closely. Mozambican leaders were inspired by Angola’s 
model towards peace but when Angola’s peace failed they decided to alter their 
strategies. Hence, they were not only focusing on the success and failure in their 
own country – they were also watching the progress in Angola for inspiration on 
how to handle their own peace process.  
 17
 4.2 Strategic Constituencies 
Different networks like the media, independent scholars, religious institutions, 
peace institutions, government officials, intergovernmental and government 
officials and donors, relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs), former 
members of the military, members of the business community are what are seen as 
strategic constituencies. (Rupesinghe 1995) It is important to involve the civil 
society in the peace process cause they work as a guarantor of any negotiated 
peace. Strategic constituencies are also important in order to uphold the peace 
process over time. Another “principal aim of these strategic groups should be to 
help build the political will to promote and maintain peace building” (ibid 
1995:82). It is important for the peace process that “all constituencies of society 
have a stake in peace” (Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000).  
4.2.1 Angola  
The civil society in Angola was relatively underdeveloped before the Bicesse 
Accord, so the civil society had no role in the peace process since they were not 
allowed to exist in the country. “The only truly non-governmental groups allowed 
to operate before the end of the 1980s were run by church organisations Caritas 
Angola and the Council of Evangelical Organisations of Angola” (Vines et. al 
2005:7). Furthermore, “the state controlled the media and mass organizations for 
youth, for women, for workers and for some of the professions” (Meijer & 
Birmingham 2004). MPLA took exclusive control of organizations and hindered 
any development of the civil society with the exception of various churches and 
faith-based groups, which still did not get involved in the peace process. “Without 
‘buy in’ from the general population, implementation of a peace agreement is 
extremely difficult” (Gounden & Solomon 2001:192).  
4.2.2 Mozambique 
In Mozambique people at “all levels of Mozambican society” were interested in 
ending the war within the country (Greenhill & Major 2007:25). CCM, the 
umbrella body uniting 17 of the country’s Protestant Churches, worked hard in 
order to get RENAMO to be willing to participate in negotiations. CCM did fairly 
early take on an active role in the peace work – working for reconciliation and 
getting the two warring parties into negotiations. They were the first to openly call 
for peace.  
A newspaper called Noticias openly gave credit to CCM on their work 
towards peace, which made people in Mozambique aware of the peace work and 
that CCM were working towards peace. It is, according to Rupesinghe, central to 
promote peace in order to maintain a peace process’s legitimacy with the 
inhabitants of a country. Several of the “‘grassroots’ initiatives have been praised 
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 by observers for their contribution to securing and building peace in 
Mozambique” (Moran & Pitcher 2004:511). 
4.3 The Role of Outside Peacemakers 
Outside peacemakers play an important part in intrastate wars since “the state 
cannot play the role of non-partisan broker because the state is often a party to the 
conflict” (Solomon & Mngqibisa 2000). “Diplomacy and outside non-
governmental peacemakers have important roles to play in mediating the 
mitigation or resolution of violent internal conflict” (Rupesinghe 1995:84).   
4.3.1 Angola 
Outside peacemakers did not, as seen above, put in a lot of resources into the 
Angolan peace process. One example is the UN which played basically no roll 
during the negotiations which lead up to the Bicesse Accord. They were only 
called into the negotiations at the end. Eventually the UN initialized a mission 
called United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). The UN gave 
Angola $118 million towards peace keeping efforts. “The United Nations mission 
charged with monitoring the ceasefire and the planned elections was woefully 
short-staffed and poorly funded – less than one-fourth the amount allocated to 
Namibia in 1989, for a country with ten times the population and a war-ravaged 
infrastructure” (Minter 1994:54). The UN’s Special Representative Margaret 
Anstee pointed out that the UN should never have carried out a peace process 
during the circumstances which occurred in Angola. Furthermore, she pointed out 
that there was a serious lack of resources like “people, money, mandate” 
(Messiant 2004). If the UN would have supported Angola as much as they did 
support Mozambique, which we will see below, than the peace in Angola would 
have been more likely to last since the UN could have helped with several tasks 
during the peace process. “The narrow nature and the low-budget character of 
UNAVEM’s mandate was completely inadequate in relation to what was needed” 
(Ohlson 1998:146). This can be contrasted to Mozambique “which drew great 
attention from the UN leadership and donor countries” (Jeong 2005:192).  
4.3.2 Mozambique 
In Mozambique several outside peacemakers were involved in the peace process; 
the UN, other countries, Rowland and President Mugabe. “The United States 
played a prominent facilitative role in getting these negotiations under way and 
then continued to consult closely with the mediators and both Mozambican parties 
throughout the subsequent 2 years of talks” (Cohen 1992).  UN invested $327 
million in 1993 and $295 million in 1994 towards peace keeping efforts in 
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 Mozambique, which can be compared to the amount invested in Angola, as seen 
above. The UN initialized an operation called the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in order to implement the peace agreement and to 
monitor the cease fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. “These efforts, along 
with the presence of thousands of UN troops and observers, increased faith among 
the exhausted Mozambican population that ONUMOZ would guarantee the peace 
and protect them against possible predations by defectors from the agreement” 
(Greenhill & Major 2007:25). In line with ONUMOZ, elections would not be held 
until the military situation was under control and the agreement could not be 
“implemented unless the Mozambican parties made a determined effort in good 
faith to honour their commitments” (UN 2001). Furthermore, the UN became 
aware of the fact that financial carrots were of importance for a successful peace 
process in Mozambique. Hence, “a donor found to facilitate Renamo’s 
transformation to a political party was set up by the UN” (Ohlson 1998:137). 
Therefore the UN was one of the peace makers who supported RENAMO on its 
way from guerrilla to a political party.  
It is worth noting that “during the period of demobilization and lead-up to 
elections, nearly 8000 international troops and civilian police observers were on 
the ground in Mozambique – an area less than two-thirds the size of Angola – 
whereas only 556 observers were on the ground in Angola during the analogous 
period, 100 of whom were only election observers” (Greenhill & Major 2007:25-
26). This shows that the UN was more devoted to Mozambique than Angola since 
they sent more resources there. “Given the fragility of the state in these two 
former Portuguese colonies, the UN was expected to facilitate both transition 
processes through peace operations” (Malaquias 1998). They did, but with a much 
greater extent to Mozambique than Angola.  
The Community of Sant’ Egidio had a broad knowledge about the war and 
therefore they could play a helpful part in the peace process. “Sant’ Egidio hosted 
12 rounds of peace talks in Rome” (Vines 1996:129). “Sant’ Egidio provided an 
acceptable “neutral forum” in which the major players could directly negotiate on 
how to end the war and divide the remaining political spoils” (Vines 1996:147). 
The Community also put pressure on the Italian Government to get involved in 
trying to achieve peace in Mozambique.  
The Italian Government understood “that aid packages and other financial 
incentives would be needed to cajole the parties into reaching a final settlement” 
(Armon et. al. 1998). The Italian Government gave RENAMO a significant 
amount of money in order to make them stay in the peace process. “By the time of 
the signing of the Rome accord, the Italian government had spent some US $20 
million on the peace process” (Vines 1998). Unlike in Angola, the UN was in 
charge of the peace process in Mozambique, which could be one of the reasons 
why Mozambique came out as a success whilst Angola’s peace quite promptly 
failed.  
Diplomatic officials from several countries were involved in the Mozambican 
peace process. For example other African countries like Kenya, Malawi and South 
Africa.  
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 4.4 The Role of Local Peacemakers 
It is important that the local community is involved in the peace process. 
“Influential members of the local communities with a first-hand knowledge of the 
conflict, actors, the political and economic situation and the cultural background 
will have a distinct ‘comparative advantage’ over other potential peacemakers 
wishing to act as third-party mediators. What is more, they will ‘own the peace’ 
once it is made, and will maintain a stake in ensuring its sustainability” 
(Rupesinghe 1995:85). The local community will have a deeper understanding of 
the war taking place in their country than outside actors.  
4.4.1 Angola 
There were no local peacemakers in Angola. Therefore the “parties were 
increasingly dependent on the attention of outside sponsors” (Gounden & 
Solomon 2001:193). Most likely the outcome of the peace process in Angola 
would have been a different one if local peacemakers, with their familiarity and 
deeper understanding of the war, would have been involved in the process and the 
contents of the Bicesse Accord.  
4.4.2 Mozambique 
CCM took the first initiatives to peace in Mozambique. CCM had connections to 
both warring parties which was an invaluable resource in the peace process, since 
CCM could play the part of an “informal leader”. “The Catholic Church, whom 
the government media had consistently vilified for calling for dialogue with 
Renamo, became the mediating party” (Cabrita 2001:269).   
1984 CCM “became actively involved in the peace process” (Vines 
1996:120). They made it clear that they thought that dialogue was the only way to 
solve the war. CCM wrote open letters calling for a dialogue between the 
Government and RENAMO. Hence, it became known to the public that CCM 
were working for dialogue and peace. In 1987 CCM made clear to Mozambique’s 
president Chissano that they would get in touch with RENAMO. As a 
consequence of that, Chissano encouraged CCM to talk to RENAMO. CCM held 
several talks with RENAMO on the way towards peace. FRELIMO and 
RENAMO considered CCM to be a neutral party which made it possible for CCM 
to hold meetings and negotiations between the two warring factions. 
In the beginning the warring parties did not want to talk directly with each 
other. That gave CCM an important role since they were the ones who had to 
uphold the dialogue between the parties since both parties trusted CCM 
(Sengulane & Gonçalves 1998). “The churches pursued various strategies to help 
speed up the talks. The launching of petition campaigns, with signatures gathered 
in Mozambique, Italy and Portugal, as well as public prayers for peace, were a 
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 great help in drawing attention to Mozambique’s plight and reminding the 
delegations that the people’s suffering continued.” (Sengulane & Gonçalves 1998) 
CCM set up networks working together with different parties. CCM adopted 
principles in their quest for peace, which for example included: 
 
• Look for what unites rather than what divides.  
• Discuss problems step by step.  
• Keep in mind the suffering that so many people endure as war 
continues.  
• Work with the friends and supporters of both sides; this is 
fundamental.  
• Remember the deeper dimensions of peace such as forgiveness, justice, 
human rights, reconciliation and trust.  
• Work with other groups; the power of the churches was much 
increased by their inter-denominational cooperation. (ibid)   
 
Furthermore, “organisations, communities and individuals who locally negotiated 
peace zones during the war through special rituals or purification ceremonies, 
through the use of magic by local chiefs and spirit mediums, through the 
performances of dances and plays that condemned war and encouraged peace, and 
through the use of soccer games to end the conflict and to provide mechanisms for 
dispute mediation” (Moran & Pitcher 2004:503). Hence, several local 
peacemakers were involved in the peace process. 
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 5 Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis was to perform a comparative analysis of why 
Angola’s peace failed and Mozambique’s lasted, by answering the following 
question: How can it, with the help of Rupesinghe’s model, be explained why the 
peace in Angola failed whilst the peace in Mozambique lasted? 
Angola and Mozambique have similar backgrounds. They are both former 
Portuguese colonies which suffered long-lasting intrastate wars, but after their 
first respective peace agreements they experienced different outcomes. Angola 
soon again plunged back into war, whilst Mozambique’s peace has lasted ever 
since. With the help of the eleven elements of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict 
transformation it became clear to what extent the countries employed initiatives 
during their peace processes.  
Rupesinghe emphasizes the importance of bringing the warring parties into 
negotiations, and also to be aware of whether the parties are ready to negotiate for 
peace or not. As for Angola negotiations were imposed on the parties and MPLA 
and UNITA came to the negotiations out of the wrong reasons. No actors from the 
civil society were involved in the peace process in Angola, which is a requisite in 
order for it to be successful. In Mozambique, on the other hand, both parties came 
to realise that now was the time for negotiations and in Mozambique the “whole” 
country was involved in the peace process. In Angola it was only the superpowers 
that were engaging in the peace process. In Mozambique local actors (like women 
groups), facilitators (like Tiny Rowland), strategic constituencies (the newspaper 
Noticias) and local peace makers (like CCM) were all involved in one way or 
another.  
Angola had many root causes to its internal war. The main problem was that 
both leaders of the warring parties wanted to rule the country. Furthermore, 
Angola’s rich natural resources, like oil and diamonds, and also ideological and 
ethnic issues were reasons to the war. Despite there being several causes to the 
war they did not get addressed during the negotiations. In Mozambique most of 
the root causes got solved, and even though not all of them got solved the 
Mozambican people were happy with the outcome and it is a requisite for a 
durable peace that the peace has the support of the country’s people.   
Furthermore, the UN put enormously more effort into Mozambique than 
Angola in order to sustain the peace process. With regards to Mozambique being 
less than two-thirds the size of Angola it is remarkable that only about 400 UN 
peacekeepers got sent to Angola compared to around 8000 to Mozambique. 
Therefore, the prospects for peace in Angola severely weakened, since 
peacekeeping troops are important in order to keep the order in a country during 
demobilisation leading up to elections. In Angola it was only the superpowers that 
could be classed as being outside peacemakers, whilst in Mozambique there were 
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 several outside peacemakers who were involved. Apart from the countries that 
had been supporting FRELIMO and RENAMO during the war, also the Italian 
Government, the Community of Sant’ Egidio, individual persons and several 
African countries were involved in Mozambique’s peace process.  
In Angola a realistic timetable for all the tasks that the country had to go 
through during the pace process was not set up. Since UNITA was only interested 
to get the election over and done with, since they were convinced they would win, 
they opted for a maximum of twelve months between the ceasefire and the 
election. MPLA on the other hand opted for 36 months. Eventually, they settled 
for fifteen to eighteens months which was to short a time considering Angola’s 
history of several difficult disputes. Furthermore, since Angola did not have a 
system evaluating success and failure during the peace process, they did look 
upon what was succeeding or failing during the peace process. If they had done 
they would have realised that the timetable was not realistic and they could have 
altered it in accordance with what was occurring. In Mozambique the parties 
agreed that they would take one issue at the time and not move on to the next 
issue until the former one was solved. Furthermore, the parties postponed the 
election with one year from when it was originally scheduled since they realised 
that it was not realistic to go through with an election until the distrust between 
RENAMO and FRELIMO was solved. Mozambique was also watching Angola’s 
process carefully since Angola was one year ahead with their peace process. The 
parties involved in Mozambique’s peace process could therefore see what was 
succeeding and failing in Angola, and from that learn lessons on how to cope with 
their own peace process.  
The second purpose of the thesis was to test the usefulness of Rupesinghe’s 
model of conflict transformation in order to understand why a country’s peace last 
or fail. To be able to do this I tested the model on Angola (the failure) and 
Mozambique (the success). Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation is good 
in that aspect that it is a broad approach which takes up several different elements 
as being important in order to achieve a durable peace. It involves elements like 
setting a realistic timetable, the importance of identifying facilitators and all the 
actors, and the role of outside and local peacemakers, etcetera. The model’s flaws 
are that Rupesinghe does not describe some of the elements very clearly. The 
elements of identifying all the actors and strategic constituencies are quite similar 
and it is a bit difficult to actually understand the complete differences between 
them. Identifying all the actors entail that for example elites, leaders and opinion-
shapers should get identified and brought into the peace process. It also states that 
non-violent actors should get involved. This does not differ a lot from the element 
strategic constituencies which for example involve the media (which also could be 
classed as opinion-shapers), government officials (which also could be classed as 
elites or leaders) and the churches and NGOs (which also could be classed as non-
violent actors. Hence, Rupesinghe should have developed what these elements 
involve more thoroughly so that it would have been clearer. Now they appear to 
be too similar.  
Something else about Rupesinghe’s model is that it lacks an, which I consider, 
important element; namely culture. There are different groups of people living 
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 both in Angola and Mozambique and most likely they have different cultural 
backgrounds, which need to be taken into account during the peace process. This 
element should be considered and I reason that Rupesinghe’s model should be 
developed in order to include an element of culture. This could be done in a future 
study of Rupesinghe’s model of conflict transformation.  
To summarize; it became clear during the analysis that Mozambique in 
general employed more initiatives during their peace process, compared to 
Angola. If Angola would have employed initiatives on every element in 
Rupesinghe’s model, than perhaps the outcome of Angola’s peace process would 
have been as successful as Mozambique’s. As mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, there are surely several ways to study why Angola’s peace failed and 
Mozambique’s lasted, but Rupesinghe’s model serves as one way of explaining 
why Angola was a failure and Mozambique a success. The analyses showed that 
all elements in Rupesinghe’s model are out of importance in order to achieve a 
durable peace.  
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